Monetary policy in Asia: approaches and implementation by Suchada Kirakul & Bank for International Settlements
BIS Papers No 31  199
 
 
Comments on “Understanding monetary policy in 
Malaysia and Thailand: objectives, instruments and 




The paper provides an informative review of Thailand’s current monetary policy framework 
and demonstrates a good understanding of Thai financial market development. Thus, my 
comments will focus on some issues raised in the paper regarding Thailand, in order to 
enhance the completeness of the paper. 
Monetary policy goals 
The paper states that the two main monetary policy goals of the Bank of Thailand (BOT) are 
low inflation and stable exchange rates. Even though the BOT’s objectives are often cited so, 
it is important to emphasise that the overriding goal under the inflation targeting framework is 
price stability, with a view to enhancing sustainable growth in the long term. Exchange rate 
stability, however, is now regarded as a desirable condition subsumed under the price 
stability goal. For an open economy like Thailand, it is undeniable that the exchange rate still 
bears important influence on domestic prices. Therefore, mild exchange rate volatility 
complements overall price stability, and the two goals should not be considered as 
independent.  
Exchange rate stability 
Under the managed float exchange rate regime, extreme exchange rate movements have 
occasionally been limited by the central bank’s intervention. Broadly speaking, the BOT does 
not attempt to influence the exchange rate level, for that should be left to the market based 
on the true fundamentals of the economy. However, when exchange rate movements 
become too volatile, for example with sudden shifts in global market sentiments, the BOT 
may decide to take action but only to slow down the speed of change in order to allow 
adequate time for the real sector to adjust accordingly. 
It is well understood in Thailand that exchange rate intervention may have grave 
consequences in the long term. Therefore, the central bank has been doing less rather than 
more market intervention, which is consistent with the message sent out to the public. Over 
time, as the domestic financial market matures, the public will be better equipped with the 
tools to protect themselves from exchange rate volatility, and thus the central bank’s role on 
this front can be expected to diminish even further. 
In the paper, the author observes the exchange rate volatilities over two periods and draws 
the conclusion that the intervention policy under the present BOT governor (June 2001-
present) is more active than that under the former governor (May 1998-May 2001). However, 
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exchange rate volatility reflects not only the policy stance but also the prevailing economic 
and market environment during each period of time. Incidentally, exchange rate volatilities of 
Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand all diminished substantially in the latter 
period when compared to the former (Table 1). These regional countries were hit hard by the 
financial crisis of 1997-1998, and thus the reduction in the exchange rate volatility in the case 
of Thailand is likely to reflect improved economic fundamentals and confidence, just like in 




Historical volatilities of selected Asian currencies 
  Jan 1999-May 2001  Jun 2001-Dec 2005 
Indonesia - IDR  20.46  9.28 
Thailand    
Bilateral THB/USD  7.04  4.03 
Effective exchange rate  6.65  3.44 
Philippines - PHP  12.81  4.72 
South Korea - KRW  9.92  7.41 
Note: Volatility is measured as the annualised standard deviation of the daily percentage changes. 
Source: Bank of Thailand. 
 
Other goals 
The paper mentions that, with both monetary and supervisory responsibilities, the BOT has 
goals other than those pertaining to monetary policy, namely, financial stability and 
developmental goals. 
Under financial stability, asset prices are alluded to as an area of possible concern of the 
central bank. In practice, the BOT has no asset price target, explicit or implicit, but it does 
use asset price information to detect fragilities in the economy. The use of asset price 
information can serve both monetary and prudential policy, and the choice of policy 
instrument may vary as the BOT deems suitable. For example, if an asset price bubble 
reflects overall demand pressure, monetary policy may be tightened along with a stepping up 
of prudential measures to safeguard macroeconomic stability as well as financial institutions’ 
stability. In some cases, however, the asset price bubble reflects a localised fragility, and the 
use of monetary policy is likely to be too broad to address the problem even though it 
pertains to macroeconomic stability. Under such circumstances, the BOT may opt to use 
prudential measures, instead of tightening monetary policy, for the macroeconomic stability 
goal. It simply demonstrates how the BOT uses its policy tools flexibly and concertedly, for 
macroeconomic and financial stability goals in the end serve the same ultimate objective of 
economic stability in support of long-term growth. 
As for the development of the bond market, it should not be viewed as an independent 
developmental goal. The development of the bond market will help enhance monetary policy 
transmission and thus, in a broad sense, serves the monetary policy goal. Table 2 illustrates BIS Papers No 31  201
 
 
the development in terms of market depth, with the outstanding value of government bonds
3 
to GDP increasing substantially from the pre-crisis period (1993-1997) thanks in part to the 
budget deficits in recent years. Meanwhile, progress has also been made on other fronts, 
such as the exemption of withholding tax, to provide easier access to all players and 
enhance the participation of both investors and private issuers. 
What would be useful in the study of Thailand’s monetary policy is an analysis of whether 
monetary and prudential roles of the BOT tend to conflict with or support each other on the 












2000-05  2005 
Government 
bonds 47.6  507.0  1,046.5  1,360.5 
T-bills 0  12.5  135.0  209.0 
NGDP 4,070.6  4,631.8 5,840.4 7,104.2 
Total outstanding 
(%  GDP)  1.2 11.2 20.2 22.1 
Sources: Thai Bond Market Association; National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). 
Instruments 
Setting policy interest rates 
In setting the policy interest rate, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meets eight times 
each year to assess recent economic conditions and consider the inflation and economic 
outlook over the next two years. With the assistance of forecasting tools and the MPC 
members’ views, the risk of core inflation breaching the target range of 0-3.5% (quarterly 
average) determines the MPC’s policy reaction. 
Policy rates: choice, rhythm of decision-making and activism 
From past reactions of the MPC, the paper concludes that monetary policy in Thailand is 
more active than its counterpart in Malaysia. The conclusion is based on the fact that the 
policy rate in Thailand was raised by 375 basis points between August 2004 and 
October 2005, while the Central Bank of Malaysia kept its policy rate unchanged between 
February 2004 and August 2005. Again, this comparison downplays the differences in the 
underlying structure and environment of the two economies. For example, Malaysia is an oil-
exporting economy whereas Thailand is an oil-importing country (Chart 2). That alone should 
suggest that, even with the same degree of inclination for policy activism, monetary policy in 
the two countries may have to react differently to an oil price shock. Moreover, Thailand is an 
inflation targeter but Malaysia is not. That may also suggest a different degree of concern 
over inflation risk. 
                                                  



















































































Net import of fuel and lubricants 
to GDP at current prices (2005)
Oil import dependency index














































































Source: World Bank. 
Goals, instruments and higher energy prices 
The paper argues that the BOT uses core inflation as the policy target but also gives 
consideration to headline inflation. I would like to add to the point by saying that having core 
inflation as the target does not preclude the use of other price information for policy 
deliberation. The case with headline inflation is a good example. With high oil prices and their 
subsequent pass-through to the prices of other goods and services, headline inflation tends 
to lead core inflation more so than it used to. As a result, the MPC monitors headline inflation 
closely and uses it as an indicator of future pressure on core inflation, of course with the 
degree of lead varying up to a number of factors including demand pressure.  
Independence 
Behavioural independence 
Although the BOT’s charter (the Bank of Thailand Act of 1942) does not guarantee the 
central bank independence from the power of the government, in practice the BOT has 
behavioural independence to some degree. However, this may not be reflected by the 
paper’s indicator of choice, namely, the turnover rate of the central bank governor. For 
example, it is difficult to assess the central bank’s behavioural independence from the 
turnover rate alone given different political setups in Malaysia and Thailand. Moreover, when 
normalised by the turnover rate of the prime minister, the turnover rate of the central bank 
governor in Thailand is roughly half that of Malaysia, suggesting that central bank governors 
in Thailand may be less affected by political changes than in Malaysia once the turnover of 
the head of government is controlled for (Table 3). 
Table 3 
Turnover rate of central bank governor 
 Thailand  Malaysia 
Central bank governor turnover  20 (1942-present) 7  (1959-present) 
Prime minister turnover  29 (1942-present) 5  (1957-present) 
Central bank governor turnover 
normalised by PM turnover  0.69  1.4 
Sources: Bank of Thailand; Royal Thai Government; Wikipedia. 
Sources: CEIC, Customs Department, NESDB. BIS Papers No 31  203
 
 
Balance sheet independence 
Although the Bank of Thailand Act of 1942 allows the BOT to finance the government directly 
through monetisation, the law allowing the government to conduct such business was 
terminated in 1960.
4 At the same time, the BOT has not participated in the primary 
government bond market over the past decade. 
Last but not least, one point should be clarified regarding the BOT’s assistance to distressed 
financial institutions through the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF). The paper 
states that “[I]n one round the government undertook to pay interest coupons on bonds sold 
to recapitalise the FIDF, while the Bank of Thailand undertook to pay the corpus of the bond 
out of profits on management of the foreign exchange reserves. Given that the foreign 
exchange reserves are financed at the margin largely by interest-bearing debt, it might have 
been better to pay off the bonds out of the profit from the note issue.” As a matter of fact, the 
BOT is paying off the principal of the fiscalisation bonds out of the annual net profits from 
both the “General Account” (typical central banking business) and the “Currency Reserve 
Account”, which is more or less the Note Issue Department’s account. It should be 
emphasised that the key point here is that the FIDF’s losses have been resolved, rather than 
the BOT’s balance sheet independence having been compromised, because such an 
arrangement is equivalent to regular profit remittance from the point of view of the BOT. 
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